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been safeguarded by having counsel. The harshness of the statute under which
the accused was tried would not enter into the accepted calculation of due
process, since it was admittedly not unconstitutional. The remaining element,
the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the act,
which to the Court seemed deserving of great weight, has not been previously
introduced into the formula. It is true that the mental condition of the accused
at the time of plea, and even during the pre-arraignment stages of criminal
proceedings, have been held to affect constitutionally the acceptance of a plea
or in the latter instance the admissibility of a confession. 17 The mental con-
dition of the accused at the time of the acthad been regarded by the trial
court, and its value as a defense presumably judged by the accused's attorney
in advising the accused to plead guilty. Accordingly, fresh consideration of this
factor in a coram nobis hearing does not seem especially called for by the
demands of due process. It is quite clear that all of these factors entered into
the Court's decision, and all the factors appear in toto to amount to the dep-
rivation of due process. But little in the Court's holding suggests anything
more than an ad hoc decision tied to a combination of facts having varied
significance. The decision affords only limited authority for including any one
factor as dominant in reaching the conclusion of whether there was due proc-
ess, although now in a minimal way these new factors may properly be
considered in determining whether or not the accused's plea has been fairly
taken. The holding of the instant case is in accord with the recent pronounce-
ment by the Court regarding the scope of coram nobis, "this court has not
hesitated to expand its scope when necessary to afford the defendant a remedy
in those cases in which no other avenue of judicial relief appeared available." 18
W. J. L.
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY MEANS OF WIRETAP ADmISSIBLE IN STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING
Defendants were convicted on gambling indictments through evidence
obtained by intercepted telephone conversations. From adverse judgments of
the County Court and Appellate Division, defendants appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Held: convictions affirmed, three judges dissenting. Wiretap evi-
dence secured pursuant to state law is admissible in evidence in New York
criminal proceedings. People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962). 1
In New York, though statute forbids such evidence to be introduced in
17. Gallegos v. Colorado, supra note 15; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961); Haley v. Ohio, supra note 15; People v. Boehm, 309 N.Y. 362, 368, 130 N.E.2d
897, 900 (1955).
18. People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 93-94, 176 N.E.2d 90, 91, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77,
78 (1961).
1. 15 A.D.2d 786, 224 N.Y.S.2d 624 (2d Dep't 1962).
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a civil case,2 wiretap information may be lawfully obtained by a state official
through a court order.3 Such information, although it violates a federal statute,4
and exposes the state official to criminal penalties, has nonetheless been ad-
missible in evidence in New York state criminal proceedings. 5 A federal officer,
however, may not testify as to wiretap evidence in a state proceeding." This
federal procedural prohibition likewise applies to a state official who attempts
to testify in a federal proceeding concerning such evidence, notwithstanding
the fact that it was obtained according to state law.7 In view of the federal
statute and inconsistent positions between New York and federal courts, one
judge has refused to issue such a court order permitting the use of electronic
eavesdropping.8
The current problem was first brought before the Supreme Court in 1928,
in Olmstead v. United States,9 which held that wiretapping did not constitute
an unreasonable search and therefore was not constitutionally prohibited.
Within six years, Congress passed Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act which forbade either the interception or the divulgence of interstate or
foreign communication by wire which was not authorized by the sender.10
Although the statute was held to extend to federal officers,
1 private persons, 12
intrastate as well as interstate communication,' 3 the Supreme Court in Schwartz
v. Texas held that wiretap evidence migh be received in a state court, although
the means of obtaining it and its divulgence violated federal law.' 4 The result-
ing principles remained controlling until recently, when a question was raised
whether the admissibility of wiretap evidence was any longer a procedural rule
of the forum. In 1961, the focal point in the controversy centered on the
Supreme Court decision of Mapp v. Ohio, which made applicable to the states
the exclusionary rule that evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was
inadmissible.' 5
The issue in the case at bar was whether Mapp had the effect of depriving
the states of giving effect to their own public policy "guaranteed" them by the
Court in Schwartz v. Texas. Although the Supreme Court last month denied
certiorari in the instant case, thus precluding review of this question for the
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345(a).
3. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12; see also N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813(a).
4. 47 U.S.C. 605 (1934).
5. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); People v. Feld, 305 N.Y. 322, 113 N.E.2d
440 (1953).
6. Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 5.
7. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
8. See in re Interception of Telephone Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d
84 (Sup. Ct., 1958).
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. Supra note 4.
11. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. Ibid.
13. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
14. Supra note 5.
15. 367 U.S. 143 (1961).
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time being,16 the majority in Dinan believed that Mapp had no effect on the
wiretap doctrine, sub silentio, in view of a decision on the eve of Mapp denying
a federal injunction sought against a state court in the use of such evidence.17
Indeed, the majority had few qualms about admitting wiretap evidence in such
a case and stated that it would continue to do so until it is precluded by
statute or Supreme Court ruling.' 8 The Court reemphasized the proposition
that the question of admissibility of such evidence was a policy of the forum
rather than a constitutional mandate or a congressional requirement. The Court
said that the rationale behind Mapp was solely an effective means of enforcing
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure but that the
same sanction could not be applied to the enforcement of a federal statute,
to wit, section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
The dissent attacked the majority on two grounds. First, it reasoned that
the Court's decision resulted in legal sanctioning of criminal activities by state
officials. It further declared that the concept of judicial integrity demanded
conformity to the federal rule in this matter.
There are legal authorities who maintaifi that the New York method
should be followed and the federal statute redrafted so as to allow in certain
cases wiretapping or "mechanical overhearing."' 19 The Justice Department
earlier this year requested federal legislation to permit the use of wiretaps
in specific major offenses.20 Despite the fact that the need for efficient, effective,
and modern crime detection is the basis for this New York decision, the Court
offers no persuasive arguments to buttress their holding. If we as citizens under
this statute, have neither a constitutional right nor a congressional mandate,
we do have, at least a clearly defined substantive right as regards the privacy
of our communications. If the Court of Appeals is going to allow our federal
rights to be violated criminally, a cogent analysis of the problem and a
reasoned result is in order. We may note that any attempt to vindicate wire-
tapping should be subject to an immediate attack, that personal privacy should
be entitled to more judicial protection than property rights, which the courts
have so scrupulously guarded in the past. The limited use of wiretapping
should be sanctioned if two factors exist: first, that the requirements of national
security necessitate such a use of wiretap; second, that wiretapping is essential
and merely not convenient for combatting criminal activity. Such factors have
not thus far been successfully demonstrated and there is doubt as to whether
16. -U.S (1962).
17. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
18. People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962).
19. Fisch, New York Evidence § 728 (1959). "The prohibition embodied in section 605
of the Federal Communications Act should be redrafted so as to allow law enforcement
officers to utilize all the mechanical and electronic devices available for intercepting messages
and conversation provided certain safeguards to the right of privacy have been met. .. ."
20. Fisch, New York Evidence § 727 (Supp. 1962) (". . . Such wiretaps would be
limited to the investigation of murder, kidnapping, blackmail, bribery and illegal narcotics
traffic . . .").
COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
they are susceptible of demonstration. 2' Mere convenience in crime detection
as well as unproved allegations of threats to national security do not provide
a convincing argument for mass governmental invasion of personal privacy.
Under New York law the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
substantially protected by requiring a warrant which describes with particular-
ity "the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. '22 This
provides an effective safeguard against government evidentiary expeditions in
the area of real and personal property. Immediately following, a clause in the
Constitution dealing with wiretapping states: "The right of the people to be
secure against unreasonable interception of telephone communications shall
not be violated." This clause, however, is completely negated by the following
sentences which permit government officials to listen to each and every con-
versation of a citizen regardless of its relevance to the investigation in the hopes
that something incriminating will turn up. Thus, while the law provides adequate
protection against intrusions into a citizen's real and personal property rights,
it has emasculated an individual's right to privacy. We have advanced beyond
the Lockean concept of law as primarily the protector of property, to a
realization of law "as the strongest link between man and freedom. ' 23 Such
tactics are reminiscent of the monstrosities in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-
Four and are inconsistent with the principles of a free society.
W. A. C.
EVIDENCE OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS IRRELEVANT IN
OBSCENITY PROSECUTION
Two bookstore operators in the City of New York were arrested by a
plainclothes detective after his purchase of allegedly obscene publications.
Both were charged with violating section 1141 of the Penal Law, which makes
it a misdemeanor for anyone to sell or have in his possession with intent to
sell any obscene book. Upon the trial of the action the defense counsel at-
tempted to introduce into evidence various other publications similar in content
to those the defendants had sold. These were offered in proof by presenting
them to the arresting officer, who was then asked if he had seen such issues
sold throughout the city. Moreover, counsel attempted to put two such pub-
lications, handled by other newsstands and bookstores, directly into evidence
to show the state of contemporary community standards regarding obscenity.
The trial court excluded such evidence. A collateral issue was raised as to
whether the proof was sufficient to prove that the defendants had knowledge of
the contents of the books. On appeal of convictions, held; affirmed, two judges
concurring in separate opinions and two judges dissenting. The proffered evi-
21. Williams, One Man's Freedom, ch. 7 at 88-106 (1962). For an interesting argu-
ment against the use of wiretap evidence.
22. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345(a).
23. Proclamation of President John F. Kennedy, Law Day May 1, 1961.
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